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STRATEGICALLY SIMPLE MECHANISMS
TILMAN BÖRGERS
Department of Economics, University of Michigan
JIANGTAO LI
School of Economics, Singapore Management University
We define and investigate a property of mechanisms that we call “strategic simplic-
ity,” and that is meant to capture the idea that, in strategically simple mechanisms,
strategic choices require limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be
strategically simple if choices can be based on first-order beliefs about the other agents’
preferences and first-order certainty about the other agents’ rationality alone, and there
is no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs, because such beliefs are irrelevant
to the optimal strategies. All dominant strategy mechanisms are strategically simple.
But many more mechanisms are strategically simple. In particular, strategically simple
mechanisms may be more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms in the bilateral
trade problem and the voting problem.
KEYWORDS: Mechanism design, strategic simplicity, first-order belief, local dictator-
ship, voting, bilateral trade.
1. INTRODUCTION
IN MECHANISM DESIGN, it seems useful to distinguish mechanisms in which agents face a
straightforward choice problem from mechanisms that require agents to engage in com-
plex thinking if they want to determine their optimal choices. In some cases, the mecha-
nism designer might prefer a mechanism of the former type. There are several conceivable
reasons for such a preference. For example, the mechanism designer might not be able
to predict the behavior of agents who are not capable of complex thinking. Or the mech-
anism designer might find it desirable that the outcomes of a mechanism do not depend
much on the cognitive abilities of the agents. Of course, one can also imagine settings in
which the mechanism designer prefers mechanisms that make it hard for agents to find
an optimal strategy.
In this paper, we introduce a property of mechanisms that is intended to capture the
idea that strategic choices are simple in a particular way: agents do not need to have much
strategic sophistication to determine their optimal strategies. Here, we mean by “strategic
sophistication” the ability to reason about the other agents’ preferences, the other agents’
beliefs, their beliefs about beliefs, etc. That forming higher-order beliefs is difficult seems
plausible from everyday experience, and there is also some recent experimental evidence
that points in this direction; see, for example, Alaoui and Penta (2017).
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There are, of course, many other dimensions to simplicity. For example, the sheer size
of the strategy space and the complexity of the mapping that assigns outcomes to strategy
combinations may make a mechanism difficult to understand. One may also consider the
computational complexity of finding optimal strategies. In settings in which the agents
interact repeatedly, one may consider how easy it is for the agents to learn through re-
peated play.1 The purpose of this paper is to isolate just one dimension of simplicity, and
to consider one possible formalization of this dimension.
One class of mechanisms which require little strategic sophistication is the class of dom-
inant strategy mechanisms.2 In dominant strategy mechanisms, agents need not think at
all about the motives of the other agents, or the other agents’ rationality. This is because
each agent has at least one strategy that is optimal regardless of what the other agents do,
and she can just choose such a strategy.
For many mechanism design problems, the class of dominant strategy mechanisms is
quite small, and only includes mechanisms that are rather unattractive for a mechanism
designer who wants to maximize, say, revenue, or welfare.3 We therefore introduce in this
paper a new class of mechanisms that includes, but is strictly larger than, the set of dom-
inant strategy mechanisms. We call the mechanisms in this class “strategically simple.”
We argue that, for mechanisms in this new class, the strategic sophistication needed to
find optimal strategies is quite limited. Our results show that, in applications, the set of
strategically simple mechanisms includes mechanisms that are more attractive to a mech-
anism designer concerned with fairness, efficiency, or revenue, than dominant strategy
mechanisms.
The following example illustrates our idea. Consider the well-known problem of design-
ing a mechanism that allows a seller of an indivisible object to trade with one potential
buyer. Both agents have quasi-linear preferences. It is known from Hagerty and Roger-
son (1987) that the only dominant strategy mechanisms that satisfy ex post budget balance
and individual rationality are posted price mechanisms. In a posted price mechanism, the
designer chooses a (possibly random) price, without taking into account any of the agents’
private information. The outcome depends on agents’ private information only through
their decision to trade, or not to trade, at the price proposed by the mechanism designer.
Trade comes about only when both agents agree. Obviously, this is a rather unappealing
mechanism for a welfare maximizing mechanism designer.
Now consider an alternative mechanism that we call “price cap mechanism.” The mech-
anism designer sets a price cap. The seller can refuse to trade, or choose a price less than
or equal to the mechanism designer’s price cap, and indicate that he is willing to trade at
this price, or at a lower price. If the seller is willing to trade, then the buyer can decide
whether or not to trade at the price chosen by the seller. Trade takes place only if both
agents agree to trade.
Whether or not to reduce the price, and how far to reduce the price, depends on the
seller’s belief about the buyer’s willingness to pay. But, regardless of her belief, the seller
1Mathevet (2010) introduced an approach to construct supermodular mechanisms. Supermodular mecha-
nisms are desirable in settings in which the agents interact repeatedly and in settings in which learning and
adjusting are important.
2A dominant strategy mechanism is a mechanism in which each agent has a dominant strategy regardless of
her preference. We use the phrase “dominant strategy” in the sense in which it is used in mechanism design
theory, that is, a strategy that is optimal regardless of what the other agents do. This is slightly different from
“weakly dominant” or “strictly dominant” strategies as these terms are defined in game theory. Dominant
strategy mechanisms are also called “strategy-proof” mechanisms in the literature.
3See the examples in Chapter 4 of Börgers (2015).
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will never reduce the price below her reservation value, and the buyer will never agree to
trade if the potentially reduced price is above his willingness to pay. In comparison to the
posted price mechanism, this mechanism facilitates more efficient trade.4
In the price cap mechanism, the buyer faces a straightforward choice problem. The
buyer agrees to trade if and only if his willingness to pay is weakly higher than the price
offered. The seller’s problem is arguably not too complicated either. If she believes that
the buyer accepts the trade if and only if his willingness to pay is weakly higher than the
price offered, then all that she needs to do is to consider her belief about the buyer’s will-
ingness to pay. This problem is equivalent to the standard monopoly problem with a price
ceiling, as taught in undergraduate microeconomics. For any belief that the seller might
have, it is a straightforward optimization problem. Our formal definition of strategic sim-
plicity will imply that the price cap mechanism is strategically simple.
On the other hand, the double auction described in Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)
is, in our terminology, not strategically simple. To see why, note that in the double auction,
the seller has to form her belief about the price that the buyer offers. Ideally, she would
like to ask for a price that is as close as possible to, but not above, the price that is offered
by the buyer, provided that this price is above her reservation value. But to form her belief
about the price that the buyer offers, presumably the seller first has to form her belief
about the buyer’s belief about the seller’s reservation value. Similarly, the buyer has to
form his belief about the seller’s belief about the buyer’s willingness to pay. Potentially,
infinitely many layers of such beliefs matter. Mechanisms that require of agents this level
of depth of thinking will, in our terminology, not be strategically simple.
Motivated by this example, we define in this paper a mechanism to be strategically
simple if optimal choices can be determined using first-order beliefs alone, and there is
no need for agents to form higher-order beliefs because such beliefs are irrelevant to
the optimal strategies. Here, we are referring to beliefs about the other agents’ utility
functions and rationality. Thus, a “first-order belief” of agent i is agent i’s belief about
the other agents’ (j = i) utility functions, and about the other agents’ rationality. “Higher-
order beliefs” are, for example, agent i’s belief about agent j’s belief about agent i’s utility
function, and about agent j’s belief about agent i’s rationality. We shall call a mechanism
strategically simple if, for each agent i, her belief about the other agents’ (j = i) utility
functions, combined with certainty that the other agents are rational, imply which choices
are optimal for agent i.5
Our definition of strategic simplicity allows for the possibility that only some subset
of all utility functions and some subset of all first-order beliefs are considered relevant
for the determination whether or not a mechanism is strategically simple. Our main re-
sult shows that, under a “richness” condition on the domain of relevant utility functions
and first-order beliefs, strategic simplicity is equivalent to a “local dictatorship” prop-
erty. The richness condition will be formally defined later, but we emphasize that it is
much weaker than the requirement that all possible utility functions and all possible first-
order beliefs are in the domain. In contrast with (classical) dictatorship, local dictatorship
means, roughly speaking, that there is some agent who dictates the outcome if we restrict
attention for every agent to a certain subset of her strategy set. The identity of the dicta-
tor may depend on the subsets that we consider. Every dictatorship mechanism is a local
4This mechanism was discussed in Börgers and Smith (2012).
5It is, of course, somewhat arbitrary to restrict attention to mechanisms for which only first-order beliefs
matter. We might instead allow first- and second-order beliefs to matter, for example. We discuss such varia-
tions in Section 7.
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dictatorship mechanism, but there are many more local dictatorship mechanisms than dic-
tatorship mechanisms, including mechanisms that are far from what in everyday language
is called a “dictatorship.” For example, a voting mechanism in which one agent selects
two alternatives from a larger set of several alternatives, and the other agents then vote
over those two alternatives using majority voting, is in our language a local dictatorship.
Our characterization result suggests a natural division of strategically simple mecha-
nisms into two categories: mechanisms in which there is some agent who is a local dictator
at all restrictions that we consider, and mechanisms in which this is not the case. We shall
call the former “type 1 strategically simple mechanisms,” and the latter “type 2 strate-
gically simple mechanisms.” Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms are easy to charac-
terize. One can think of type 1 strategically simple mechanisms as “delegation mecha-
nisms”: the mechanism designer delegates the choice of the mechanism to a “delegate,”
who chooses a mechanism from a given set of dominant strategy mechanisms that the de-
signer has specified. Then the other agents play this dominant strategy mechanism. The
delegate’s choice will depend on her first-order belief, while the other agents’ choices do
not require any belief formation. Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms include, as a
subclass, all dominant strategy mechanisms. The price cap mechanism presented above is
also a type 1 strategically simple mechanism.
Type 2 strategically simple mechanisms are harder to characterize in general. Instead
of attempting such a general characterization in this paper, we shall analyze type 2 strate-
gically simple mechanisms in two applications. For these applications, we will be able to
characterize not only type 1 but also, under some assumptions, type 2 strategically simple
mechanisms.
The first application that we study is the bilateral trade problem. We show that the type
1 strategically simple mechanisms are those in which one agent proposes terms of trade,
and the other agent accepts or rejects. We then show that there are no type 2 strategi-
cally simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment. Thus, we fully characterize
strategically simple mechanisms in the bilateral trade environment.
The second application that we study is the voting problem. In the voting environment,
the class of strategically simple mechanisms is much larger than the class of dominant
strategy mechanisms. By the celebrated Gibbard–Satterthwaite (Gibbard (1973), Sat-
terthwaite (1975)) theorem, in the voting environment as we define it here, a mechanism
has dominant strategies if and only if it is dictatorial. There are many more strategically
simple voting mechanisms. In this paper, we characterize type 1 strategically simple vot-
ing mechanisms and we characterize type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms when
there are two agents and three alternatives. For this special case, we show that there is
a type 2 strategically simple mechanism that is anonymous, that is, that treats both vot-
ers equally. By contrast, no type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and, in particular, no
dominant strategy mechanism, is anonymous in this setting.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the formal definition of strategic
simplicity. Section 3 presents general characterizations of strategically simple mechanisms
under a richness condition on the domain of utility functions and beliefs. Sections 4 and 5
consider strategically simple mechanisms in two applications, the bilateral trade problem
and the voting problem. Section 6 reviews the related literature. Section 7 is a discussion
of open questions.
2. DEFINITIONS
There are n agents: i ∈ I = {12     n} and a finite set A of outcomes. A mechanism
consists of a finite strategy set Si for each agent i, and an outcome function g :×i∈I Si →
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A that describes for each choice of strategies which outcome will result. We define S ≡×i∈I Si with generic element s, and, for every i ∈ I, we define S−i ≡×j =i Sj with generic
element s−i. We assume that there are no duplicate strategies: for every i ∈ I, for all
si s
′
i ∈ Si with si = s′i, there is some s−i ∈ S−i such that g(si s−i) = g(s′i s−i).
A von Neumann–Morgenstern (vNM) utility function of agent i is a function ui :A→
R. We define U to be the set of all utility functions such that: ui(a) = ui(a′) whenever a =
a′, mina∈A ui(a)= 0, and maxa∈A ui(a)= 1. Thus, we rule out indifferences and normalize
utility. This simplifies arguments below. We write u≡ (u1u2     un) and u−i ≡ (uj)j =i.
For every agent i, there is a non-empty and Borel-measurable set Ui ⊆ U of utility func-
tions that are possible utility functions of agent i. We allow for the possibility that Ui = U
to be able to capture assumptions such as the assumption that agents’ utility functions are
monotonically increasing in money. We define U≡×i∈I Ui, and, for every i ∈ I, we define
U−i ≡×j =iUj .
For a given mechanism, for every i and every ui ∈ Ui, we denote by UDi(ui) the set
of all strategies that are not weakly dominated for agent i with utility function ui, where
weak dominance may be by a pure or by a mixed strategy. If u ∈ U, we define UD(u) ≡×i∈I UDi(ui). For every i ∈ I and every u−i ∈ U−i, we define UD−i(u−i) ≡×j =i UDj(uj).
To avoid tedious detail, we assume that for every agent i ∈ I and every strategy si ∈ Si,
there is at least some ui ∈Ui such that si ∈UDi(ui).
A “utility belief” μi of agent i is a Borel probability measure on U−i. We interpret μi
as agent i’s “first-order” belief. Higher-order beliefs would be beliefs about other agents’
beliefs about utility functions, etc. As indicated in the Introduction, we want to focus on
mechanisms in which higher-order beliefs play no role. Therefore, we do not formally
define such beliefs here.
For any finite set (or Borel subset of a finite-dimensional Euclidean space) X , we shall
denote by (X) the set of all (Borel) probability measures on X . The set of all possible
utility beliefs of agent i is some non-empty subset Mi of (U−i). We allow for the possibil-
ity that Mi = (U−i) to be able to capture assumptions such as the assumption that every
agent believes that the other agents’ utility functions are stochastically independent. We
define M≡×i∈IMi, and, for every i ∈ I, we define M−i ≡×j =iMj , and we denote typical
elements of these sets by μ and μ−i, respectively.
A “strategic belief” μˆi of agent i is a probability measure on S−i: μˆi ∈ (S−i). Strate-
gic beliefs are needed for agents to determine expected utility maximizing strategies. The
next definition will describe how agents may derive a strategic belief from a utility belief.
We assume that agents are certain that the other agents do not play weakly dominated
strategies. Then, loosely speaking, a strategic belief can be obtained from a given utility
belief by dividing the probability assigned to any utility function uj (j = i) in some arbi-
trary way among the not weakly dominated strategies of agent j with utility function uj .
We call a strategic belief that can be derived in this way from a utility belief “compatible
with the utility belief.” Obviously, for a given utility belief, there may be many compati-
ble strategic beliefs. We formally define the compatibility of strategic beliefs with utility
beliefs as follows:
DEFINITION 1: A strategic belief μˆi is compatible with a utility belief μi if there is a
probability measure νi on S−i ×U−i that has support in
×
j =i
{
(sjuj) ∈ Sj ×Uj|sj ∈UDj(uj)
}
and that has marginals μˆi on S−i and μi on U−i.
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In this definition, νi is agent i’s joint belief about strategies and utility functions of
the other agents. Agent i’s certainty that the other agents do not play weakly dominated
strategies is captured by the support restriction in Definition 1. The belief νi must also
reflect the given utility belief μi of agent i, that is, νi’s marginal on U−i must be μi. The
marginal on S−i is then a compatible strategic belief. We denote the set of all strategic
beliefs that are compatible with a given utility belief μi by Mi(μi).
Given a utility function ui ∈ Ui and a strategic belief μˆi ∈ (S−i) of agent i, we denote
by BRi(ui μˆi) the set of all strategies in UDi(ui) that maximize expected utility in Si.
We are now ready to provide the key definition of this paper.
DEFINITION 2: A mechanism is strategically simple with respect toU andM6 if, for every
agent i, every utility function ui ∈Ui, and every utility belief μi ∈Mi,⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi)
BRi(ui μˆi) = ∅
What we require here for every agent i, every utility function ui of agent i, and every
utility belief μi of agent i, is that agent i has at least one strategy that maximizes expected
utility regardless of which compatible strategic belief μˆi agent i picks. Thus, there is no
need for agent i to try to distinguish more plausible from less plausible compatible strate-
gic beliefs. If that was necessary, it may be helpful for agent i to form higher-order be-
liefs. But if a mechanism is strategically simple, there is no benefit to agent i from forming
higher-order beliefs.
REMARK 1: If agent i with utility function ui has a weakly dominant strategy, then this
strategy is included in BRi(ui μˆi) regardless of what μˆi is, and the intersection referred to
in Definition 2 is non-empty because it includes the dominant strategy. Dominant strategy
mechanisms, in which all agents for all utility functions have dominant strategies, are
therefore trivially “strategically simple.”
REMARK 2: In the definition of compatible strategic beliefs (Definition 1), we allow
agents to incorporate correlations into their beliefs about the other agents’ strategies that
go beyond the correlations implied by correlations in utility beliefs and the requirement
that not weakly dominated strategies are played. As is well known, without allowing for
arbitrary correlations in strategic beliefs, the equivalence between not dominated strate-
gies and expected utility maximizing strategies need not hold. This equivalence is invoked
in our proofs. We have not pursued how our analysis would change if we did not allow
such correlations.
REMARK 3: One might conjecture that our definition of strategic simplicity of a mech-
anism is equivalent to the requirement that the mechanism, appropriately transformed
into an incomplete information game, is dominance solvable in two steps, where the first
step eliminates weakly dominated strategies and the second step eliminates strictly dom-
inated strategies. A statement very similar to this is indeed true, except that we do not
require that after two steps of the elimination procedure for every type7 a single strategy
6Whether a given mechanism is strategically simple or not depends on the domain of utility function U
and the domain of first-order beliefs M that we study. For simplicity, we sometimes drop the quantifier “with
respect to U and M” when there is no confusion.
7Here, a “type” must be interpreted as a pair consisting of a utility function and a utility belief.
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is left over, but rather, that every type has at least one strategy that is optimal for every
strategic belief about the other types’ remaining strategies. This perspective on our defini-
tion facilitates comparison with the requirement that every type have a dominant strategy,
because that just means that the elimination of dominated strategies stops after one step.
Nonetheless, we have found the definition used in this paper in terms of first-order beliefs
expresses more directly the intuitive idea on which this paper is based.
Often a mechanism designer’s interest is not in the mechanism itself, but in the out-
comes that result when agents pick their strategies rationally. For strategically simple
mechanisms, which strategy maximizes expected utility will depend not only on an agent’s
utility function, but also on this agent’s utility belief. It is therefore natural to focus on
correspondences that map utility functions and utility beliefs into sets of outcomes. We
call such correspondences “outcome correspondences.”
DEFINITION 3: The outcome correspondence associated with a mechanism that is strate-
gically simple with respect to U and M is the correspondence
F :U×MA
defined by
F(uμ)≡ g
(×
i∈I
( ⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi)
BRi(ui μˆi)
))
for all (uμ) ∈U×M
The following definition will be useful:
DEFINITION 4: Two strategically simple mechanisms are equivalent if the outcome cor-
respondences associated with these two mechanisms are the same.
The literature already contains the concept of a “social choice correspondence.” Social
choice correspondences are similar to “outcome correspondences,” except that their do-
main consists of profiles of utility functions (or preferences) only, and does not include
profiles of first-order beliefs. Focusing on utility functions in the domain seems natural if
one gives the correspondence a normative interpretation, as a reflection of the outcomes
that the mechanism designer regards desirable. Here, however, we give our correspon-
dence a positive interpretation: it is a description of the end result of a given mechanism.
By including the first-order beliefs in the domain, we give a more detailed description
of the consequences resulting from rational choice in a given mechanism than we would
obtain if only preference profiles were in the domain.
Our definition of outcome correspondences assumes that, for any given utility function
ui and utility belief μi, agent i will only choose strategies from the set⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi)
BRi(ui μˆi)
This implies that an agent i will not choose a strategy if it is a best response to only some
strategic beliefs compatible with the agent’s given utility belief, but not to all compatible
strategic beliefs. This assumption is in the spirit of our basic hypothesis that agents find
it costly to refine their strategic beliefs, beyond making them compatible with their utility
belief, and will avoid doing so if they can.
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One can interpret singleton-valued outcome correspondences as direct mechanisms in
which agents report their utility functions and their utility beliefs. Using this interpreta-
tion, one can then ask whether a revelation principle holds, that is: If a singleton-valued
outcome correspondence is implemented by a strategically simple mechanism, is then
the direct mechanism defined by the outcome correspondence itself a strategically simple
mechanism, and is truth telling an optimal strategy for all utility functions and first-order
beliefs, regardless of higher-order beliefs, in this mechanism? Unfortunately, a technical
problem that we encounter when asking this question is that we have defined strategi-
cally simple mechanisms only for the case that a mechanism has a finite strategy set for
each agent, whereas we have allowed the sets of pairs of utility functions and beliefs to be
infinite, and thus the direct mechanism may have infinite strategy sets. This problem is by-
passed if attention is restricted to the case of finiteU×M. An example due to Daniel Clark
and Drew Fudenberg (private communication) proves that even in this case, the revela-
tion principle need not be true. Roughly speaking, this is because dominating strategies
in indirect mechanisms may not be chosen by any type, and may therefore not appear in
the direct revelation mechanism.
The formal framework developed in this section suggests two possible focuses for our
analysis: the characterization of strategically simple mechanisms and the characterization
of outcome correspondences that are associated with strategically simple mechanisms.
We find it convenient to focus on mechanisms themselves. But we shall explain some of
the implications of our results for outcome correspondences.
3. CHARACTERIZATION
We now provide a characterization result for strategically simple mechanisms under
a richness assumption regarding the sets of relevant utility functions and first-order be-
liefs. We denote by R the set of all reflexive, complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric
preference relations over the set of alternatives A. A generic element of R will be de-
noted by Ri, where the index refers to agent i, and we denote by Pi the asymmetric part
of Ri. Every utility function ui ∈ U induces a preference relation in the following way:
aRib⇔ ui(a)≥ ui(b) and aPib⇔ ui(a) > ui(b). We denote by U(Ri) the set of all utility
functions in U that induce Ri.
Next, we extend the notion of weak dominance to the case that only pure strategy dom-
inance is considered. In this case, only the preference Ri induced by agent i’s utility func-
tion ui matters.
DEFINITION 5: Let Ri ∈R. A strategy si ∈ Si is weakly dominated given Ri if there is
another strategy sˆi ∈ Si such that
g(sˆi s−i)Rig(si s−i)
for all s−i ∈ S−i and
g(sˆi s−i)Pig(si s−i)
for some s−i ∈ S−i.
For any Ri ∈R, we denote by UDi(Ri)⊆ Si the set of strategies of agent i that are not
weakly dominated given Ri. For any R = (R1R2    Rn) ∈Rn, we define UD−i(R−i) ≡×j =i UDj(Rj) for every i ∈ I.
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THEOREM 1: Suppose for every agent i there is a non-empty set Ri ⊆R such that Ui =⋃
Ri∈Ri U(Ri), and suppose Mi = (U−i) for all i ∈ I. Then a mechanism is strategically
simple with respect to U and M if and only if, for every R ∈×i∈IRi, there is an agent i∗ ∈ I
such that, for every strategy si∗ ∈UDi∗(Ri∗), there is an alternative a ∈A such that
g(si∗ s−i∗)= a for all s−i∗ ∈UD−i∗(R−i∗)
In words, the condition that is necessary and sufficient for strategically simple mech-
anisms says the following. Whenever we fix a vector of preferences (R1R2    Rn) ∈×i∈IRi and consider the mechanism restricted to the strategy sets UDi(Ri) for all i ∈ I,
then, in the restricted mechanism, some agent i∗ is a dictator. That is, for each of the
alternatives that are possible when agents choose their strategies from UDi(Ri), agent i∗
has a strategy that enforces that alternative if all other agents choose from UDi(Ri), and
each of agent i∗’s strategies enforces some alternative. We call agent i∗ a “local dictator,”
because in the restricted game agent i∗ dictates which alternative is chosen.
The theorem applies only to certain domains of utility functions and beliefs. Specifi-
cally, the theorem assumes that, for each agent, the set of relevant utility functions is the
set of all utility functions that induce some preference from a given set of preferences,
and that, for each agent, the relevant beliefs are all beliefs that have support in the set
of considered utility functions. We thus allow restricted domains of strategic simplicity,
but domains that still satisfy strong “richness” conditions. In some settings, such as vot-
ing settings, these assumptions may be plausible, whereas in other settings, they may be
less desirable. For example, when the allocation of money is part of the specification of
alternatives, our assumption on the set of utility functions rules out that only risk neutral
agents are considered, even though that is a popular case in the mechanism design liter-
ature. The assumption on the set of relevant beliefs rules out that each agent regards the
other agents’ preferences as stochastically independent. Our proof of Theorem 1 makes
strong use of these assumptions, and we have not yet found useful results for smaller
domains.
Theorem 1 characterizes strategically simple mechanisms in terms of the local dictator-
ship property. The local dictatorship property is useful in several aspects. First, it provides
a powerful tool to check whether a given mechanism is strategically simple. Second, the
local dictatorship property can be used to establish several further properties of strategi-
cally simple mechanisms. These properties are contained in Appendix C. Third, we use
the local dictatorship property to further study strategically simple mechanisms in two
applications. In the bilateral trade environment that we study in Section 4, we fully char-
acterize the class of all strategically simple mechanisms. In the voting environment that
we study in Section 5, we fully characterize the class of all strategically simple mecha-
nisms when there are two agents and three alternatives. All these results build on the
local dictatorship property that we established in Theorem 1.
Furthermore, the local dictatorship property implies that certain outcome correspon-
dences cannot be associated with any strategically simple mechanism. Loosely speaking,
the set of alternatives can depend on at most one agent’s vNM utilities and utility beliefs
when we hold a preference profile R fixed. We formalize this property in the following
definition. We say that a profile of utility functions u−i induces a profile of preference
relations R−i if, for every j ∈ I \ {i}, uj induces Rj , and that a profile of utility functions u
induces a profile of preference relations R if, for every i ∈ I, ui induces Ri.
DEFINITION 6: Let i ∈ I and R ∈Rn. An outcome correspondence F : U×MA is
non-responsive to the vNM utilities and utility beliefs of agents j = i at R if, whenever ui ∈Ui
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induces Ri, u−i uˆ−i ∈U−i both induce R−i, μi ∈Mi, and μ−i μˆ−i ∈M−i, then
F
(
(uiu−i) (μiμ−i)
)= F((ui uˆ−i) (μi μˆ−i))
In words, the outcome correspondence is non-responsive to agents j = i at R if, as
long as agents’ utility functions represent the preferences in R, then the von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility functions and beliefs of agents j = i have no impact on the set of
outcomes. The following result follows directly from Theorem 1. We do not give a formal
proof.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose, for every agent i, there is a non-empty set Ri ⊆ R such that
Ui =⋃Ri∈Ri U(Ri), and suppose Mi = (U−i) for all i ∈ I. If an outcome correspondence
F : U ×M A can be associated with a mechanism that is strategically simple, then, for
every preference profile R ∈ Rn, there is some agent i∗ such that the correspondence F is
non-responsive to the vNM utilities and utility beliefs of agents j = i∗ at R.
Agent i∗ in this corollary is obviously the local dictator at R. This corollary implies, for
example, that it is typically impossible to find a strategically simple mechanism that on its
whole domain implements alternatives that maximize ex post utilitarian welfare, that is,
the sum of agents’ utilities.
We now partition the set of all strategically simple mechanisms on domains that satisfy
the assumptions of Theorem 1 into two subsets. This provides a further understanding
of strategically simple mechanisms. If the assumptions of Theorem 1 hold, then, for any
R ∈R1 ×R2 × · · · ×Rn, we denote by I∗(R) the set of local dictators at R.
DEFINITION 7: Suppose, for every agent i, there is a non-empty set Ri ⊆R such that
Ui =⋃Ri∈Ri U(Ri), and suppose Mi = (U−i) for all i ∈ I. Then a strategically simple
mechanism with respect to U and M is of type 1 if
⋂
R∈×i∈IRi
I∗(R) = ∅
Otherwise, it is of type 2.
In words, in a type 1 strategically simple mechanism, there is an agent who is local
dictator at all preference profiles, whereas this is not the case for type 2 strategically
simple mechanisms.
Type 1 strategically simple mechanisms can be easily characterized. To state this charac-
terization, we first introduce a class of mechanisms that we call “delegation mechanisms.”
DEFINITION 8: A mechanism is a delegation mechanism if it is the reduced normal form
of an extensive form mechanism of the following type: First, some agent i∗ ∈ I chooses an
element si∗ from some finite set Si∗ . All agents observe si∗ . Then, for every si∗ , a subgame
with simultaneous moves follows in which the players are the agents in I \ {i∗}, and in
which a dominant strategy mechanism with outcomes in A is played, where the mecha-
nism may depend on si∗ .
In a delegation mechanism, the mechanism designer delegates the choice of the mecha-
nism to some agent i∗. This agent has to choose a mechanism from a given set of dominant
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strategy mechanisms that the mechanism designer has specified. Clearly, in a delegation
mechanism, all agents except i∗ have dominant strategies, and therefore do not even have
to form first-order beliefs, and for agent i∗, therefore, only first-order belief is relevant
to the optimal choice. It is worth noting that dominant strategy mechanisms, in which all
agents, for all relevant utility functions, have dominant strategies, are trivially delegation
mechanisms.
THEOREM 2: Suppose, for every agent i, there is a non-empty set Ri ⊆R such that Ui =⋃
Ri∈Ri U(Ri), and supposeMi = (U−i) for all i ∈ I.
(1) Every delegation mechanism is a type 1 strategically simple mechanism.
(2) For every type 1 strategically simple mechanism, there is an equivalent delegation mech-
anism.
We do not have a characterization result for type 2 strategically simple mechanisms in
the general framework, but we do have results about type 2 strategically simple mecha-
nisms for the two applications that we consider in the next two sections. For the bilateral
trade problem, we show in Section 4 that no strategically simple mechanisms of type 2
exist. For the voting problem, we characterize in Section 5 all type 2 strategically simple
mechanisms in the case that there are two agents and three alternatives.
4. BILATERAL TRADE
We first consider an example of an environment in which outcomes include money
payments, and in which it is therefore natural to restrict attention to preferences that are
monotonically increasing in money, and to beliefs that attach probability 1 to preferences
that are monotonically increasing in money. The set of agents is I = {SB}, where S is
the seller, and B is the buyer. The set of outcomes is A = {φ} ∪ T , where “φ” stands
for “no trade,” and T is a finite subset of R++. An outcome t ∈ T corresponds to trade
at price t. We require trade to be voluntary. We refer to any mechanism for this setting
as a “bilateral trade mechanism” if each agent has a strategy that enforces the no trade
outcome.
The preferences RS over A that we consider for the seller are indexed by some value
vS > 0, and the preferences RB over A that we consider for the buyer are indexed by some
value vB > 0. We assume that for i = SB the set of possible values of vi is a finite subset
Vi of R++ such that Vi ∩ T = ∅ for i = SB, so that no agent is ever indifferent between
trade and no trade. The preference with index vS is such that the seller prefers outcome
φ to outcome t if and only if t < vS , and the seller prefers larger elements of T to smaller
ones. The preference with index vB is such that the buyer prefers outcome φ to outcome
t if and only if t > vB, and the buyer prefers smaller elements of T to larger ones.
In the notation of Section 3, we have now specified the sets Ri for i = SB. The sets of
admissible utility functions Ui and admissible beliefs Mi are as given in the first sentence
of Theorem 1. Note that the model that we have described does not assume quasi-linear
preferences. Rather, arbitrary risk attitudes are allowed.
Theorem 2 implies the following characterization of type 1 strategically simple bilateral
trade mechanisms:
PROPOSITION 1: A bilateral trade mechanism is type 1 strategically simple if and only if it
is equivalent to the normal form of a mechanism of the following type: Agents play a two-stage
game of perfect information.
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1. Agent i∗ either chooses a price t from some finite set Tˆ ⊆ T , or chooses to reject trade.
If agent i∗ rejects trade, then the game ends. No trade takes place, and no transfers are paid.
Otherwise, Stage 2 is entered.
2. Agent −i∗ accepts or rejects trade at the price t proposed by agent i∗. If agent −i∗ accepts,
then trade takes place, and the buyer pays the seller price t. Otherwise, no trade takes place,
and no transfers are paid.
To obtain the class of mechanisms described in Proposition 1, consider the following
simple argument. When there are only two agents, the second-stage dominant strategy
mechanisms as referred to in Theorem 2 are single agent mechanisms in which agent
−i∗ chooses among alternatives offered by agent i∗. Among the options offered that do
include trade, the seller, if she is agent −i∗, will always pick trade at the highest price, and
the buyer, if he is agent −i∗, will always pick trade at the lowest price. Therefore, offering
trade at more than one price is redundant. Moreover, the mechanism that the seller offers
must always include the no trade option.
Proposition 1 in fact provides a complete characterization of all bilateral trade mecha-
nisms that are strategically simple, as the following result, which we prove in Appendix D,
shows:
PROPOSITION 2: There are no bilateral trade mechanisms that are type 2 strategically sim-
ple.
Strategically simple mechanisms are more flexible than dominant strategy mechanisms
in the bilateral trade environment. Hagerty and Rogerson (1987) showed that in the bilat-
eral trade problem with quasi-linear preferences, the only dominant strategy mechanisms
that satisfy ex post budget balance and individual rationality are posted price mechanisms.
This result extends to our setting with arbitrary risk attitudes.8 As discussed in the Intro-
duction, for each posted price mechanism, there exists a corresponding type 1 strategically
simple bilateral trade mechanism (the price cap mechanism) that facilitates more efficient
trade.
5. VOTING
We now analyze strategically simple mechanisms in settings in which no restrictions
are assumed regarding the agents’ utilities or beliefs: Ui = U and Mi = (Un−1) for all
i ∈ I. Note that this is the most demanding form of strategic simplicity. We call a mecha-
nism that is strategically simple on this domain a “strategically simple voting mechanism,”
because the unrestricted domain is a domain that has been considered in parts of the vot-
ing literature. The celebrated Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973), Satterth-
waite (1975)) shows that in the voting environment, a mechanism has dominant strategies
if and only if it is dictatorial. As we shall see, there are many more strategically simple
voting mechanisms.
The voting environment satisfies the domain assumptions in Section 3. Thus, Theo-
rems 1 and 2 can be applied. We shall now distinguish type 1 and type 2 strategically
8This follows from two simple observations. First, there are more types in our setting than in the setting with
quasi-linear preferences. Thus, the set of dominant strategy mechanisms that satisfy ex post budget balance
and individual rationality in our setting is a subset of the corresponding set with quasi-linear preferences.
Second, posted price mechanisms are still dominant strategy mechanisms and satisfy ex post budget balance
and individual rationality in our setting.
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simple voting mechanisms. In a type 1 strategically simple voting mechanism, some agent
i∗ chooses a subset of the set A of alternatives and a dominant strategy mechanism for
the other agents to pick one alternative from this set. In a second stage, the other agents
then play this dominant strategy mechanism. The influence of the first agent on the ulti-
mate outcome may be restricted by limiting the set of subsets of A and dominant strategy
mechanisms she can choose from. If she can choose any arbitrary subset, then, of course,
we have the classical dictatorship.
Standard results in voting theory provide characterizations of dominant strategy mech-
anisms that can be played in the second stage. If agent i∗ rules out all but two alternatives,
then a mechanism has dominant strategies if and only if it is a generalized form of major-
ity voting (see Barberà (2010, p. 759)). If agent i∗ allows the other agents to pick from at
least three alternatives, then it follows from the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem that only
dictatorial mechanisms have dominant strategies. Thus, agent i∗, if she wants to allow at
least three alternatives, has to pick one of the other agents, and needs to let this agent
make the ultimate decision, where this agent is restricted to the set of alternatives chosen
by agent i∗.
Type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms are harder to characterize. Here, we pro-
vide a characterization for the voting environment with two agents and three alternatives,
but leave as an open question the full characterization for more general voting environ-
ments.9
PROPOSITION 3: Let #A= 3 and n= 2. A voting mechanism is type 2 strategically simple
if and only if it is one of the following two mechanisms (up to relabeling of the agents and the
alternatives):
a b+ b− c+ c−
a a a a a a
b+ a b b a b
b− a b b c b
c+ a a c c c
c− a b b c c
a b c+ c−
a a a a a
b+ a b a b
b− a b c b
c a b c c
Mechanism A Mechanism B
That the mechanisms displayed in the proposition are strategically simple can easily be
verified using Theorem 1. For each mechanism, it is also straightforward to find a pref-
erence profile for which agent 1 is the unique local dictator, and a preference profile for
which agent 2 is the unique local dictator, so that these two strategically simple mecha-
nisms are of type 2.10
The proof that there are no other type 2 strategically simple mechanisms is given in the
Supplemental Material (Börgers and Li (2019)). Here, we provide a brief discussion of
this proof. The proof begins with a general observation: Under the conditions of Theorem
1, a strategically simple mechanism is type 2 strategically simple if and only if there are at
least two agents each of whom has at least one preference for which there are multiple
9We do not even know whether type 2 strategically simple voting mechanisms exist when there are more
than two agents or more than three alternatives.
10See also our discussion of voting incentives in the two mechanisms later in this section.
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undominated strategies. In the setting of Proposition 3, we show in addition that for any
pair of such preferences, Rˆ1 and Rˆ2, the set g(UD1(Rˆ1)UD2(Rˆ2)) may have one or two
elements, but it is not possible that it has three elements.
There are then two cases to distinguish. The first is that, for all pairs of such preferences,
the set g(UD1(Rˆ1)UD2(Rˆ2)) has only one element. The second is that, for at least one
pair of such preferences, the set g(UD1(Rˆ1)UD2(Rˆ2)) has two elements. The proof in
the Supplemental Material shows that, in each of the two cases, there is a unique type 2
strategically simple voting mechanism, up to relabeling: in the first case it is mechanism
A, and in the second case it is mechanism B.
The proof also shows that for each agent, in each of the two cases listed in the previous
paragraph, there is just one preference for which there are more than one undominated
strategies. Note that this observation already implies that, in the second case, the unique
type 2 strategically simple mechanism must be non-anonymous, that is, it must give the
two agents different roles, whereas it does not imply anything about the anonymity of the
unique type 2 strategically simple mechanism in the first case. The unique strategically
simple mechanism in the first case, mechanism A of Proposition 3, turns out to be anony-
mous, as a sequence of steps that gradually narrow down the set of possible mechanisms
shows.
We now provide some discussions of the two mechanisms in Proposition 3.
Interpretation of Mechanism A: This mechanism has the following interpretation (which
also motivates the labels that we have given to the strategies). Each agent has five strate-
gies: a vote for a, a “strong vote” for b denoted by b+, a “weak vote” for b denoted by
b−, and similarly a “strong vote” and a “weak vote” for c, denoted by c+ and c−, respec-
tively. Alternative a is the default alternative. If at least one of the agents votes for the
default, then the default is chosen. If both agents vote for b (resp. c), then b (resp. c) is
chosen regardless of whether the votes are strong or weak. If one of the agents casts a
strong vote for b, but the other agent only casts a weak vote for c, then b is chosen. Simi-
larly, if one agent casts a strong vote for c, but the other agent only casts a weak vote for
b, then c is chosen. If the agents cast weak votes for different alternatives, the disagree-
ment is resolved in favor of b. If the agents cast strong votes for different alternatives, the
mechanism reverts to the default a.
Voting Incentives in Mechanism A: Let us verify that this mechanism is strategically sim-
ple. Agents who rank a top have a dominant strategy to vote for a. Let us say that an agent
i has a “weak preference for b over c” if her preference is: bRicRia. That is, she ranks the
default a below both b and c. For such an agent, a weak vote for b is weakly dominant.
Similarly, for an agent who has a “strong preference for b over c,” that is, bRiaRic, a
strong vote for b is weakly dominant.
Weak and strong preferences for c over b are analogously defined, and it is also clear
that an agent with a strong preference for c over b has the weakly dominant strategy of
voting strongly for c. The final case to consider is an agent who has a weak preference for
c over b. Such an agent has two undominated strategies: a weak or a strong vote for c.
Informally, such an agent potentially has an incentive to “overstate” the strength of her
preference. The reason is as follows. A weak vote for c will inevitably lead to b if the other
agent votes for b. If a strong vote for c is cast, then the outcome is a, which is worse than
b, if the other agent casts a strong vote for b, and the outcome is c, which is better than
b, if the other agent casts a weak vote for b. Which of these two cases is more important
depends on the utility difference between c and b, and on the agent’s belief about the
relative likelihood of the other agent having a weak or strong preference for b over c.
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Notice that in no case higher-order beliefs matter for an agent’s choice. This is obvious
if an agent has a weakly dominant choice. For agents with a weak preference for c over
b, higher-order beliefs do not matter because whether the other agent casts a weak or
strong vote for b does not depend on that agent’s first-order beliefs. Thus, the mechanism
is strategically simple.
Normative Properties of Mechanism A: Why might a mechanism designer find mecha-
nism A attractive? The most obvious attractive feature of mechanism A is that it is anony-
mous, that is, it treats the two agents equally. Anonymity is often regarded by itself as a
desirable property of a voting mechanism. No type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and
in particular no dominant strategy mechanism, is anonymous in the voting setting with
two agents and three alternatives.11
The mechanism may also appeal to a mechanism designer who maximizes expected
welfare. To show this, we consider two welfare criteria: the sum of agents’ utilities (“util-
itarian welfare”) and the minimum of agents’ utilities (“Rawlsian welfare”), and we con-
sider the comparison between mechanism A and dictatorship. Under mechanism A, when
both agents rank a in the middle, but rank different outcomes top, outcome a is chosen,
and thus agents “compromise.” This yields higher Rawlsian welfare than dictatorship, and
it might also yield higher utilitarian welfare than dictatorship, depending on the agents’
vNM utilities of the compromise. When one agent ranks c top, and the other agent ranks
c second behind b, then c is chosen, regardless of which agent ranks c top, whereas under
dictatorship c is only chosen when the first agent is the dictator. If the second agent is the
dictator, then mechanism A yields higher utilitarian and Rawlsian welfare.
On the other hand, mechanism A might also lead to a Pareto inefficiency. Pareto inef-
ficiencies harm both utilitarian welfare and Rawlsian welfare, and they are not possible
under dictatorship. A Pareto inefficiency occurs if one agent has a weak preference for c
over b and the other agent has a strong preference for b over c. Agents may end up with
a, although both prefer b to a. This happens if the agent with a weak preference for c
over b exaggerates the strength of her preference and casts a strong vote for c. But she
will do so only if the utility from b is close to zero, and therefore the loss from getting a
rather than b is “small.”
To compare mechanism A and dictatorship, the designer might adopt an ex ante per-
spective and calculate the expected welfare if she has a prior over all utility functions and
all first-order beliefs. It is clear from the analysis in the previous two paragraphs that,
depending on which prior the designer uses, she may prefer one mechanism or the other.
For concreteness, let us consider the uniform prior over all utility functions and all first-
order beliefs.12 Under the uniform distribution over all utility functions and all first-order
beliefs, mechanism A achieves higher expected welfare than the dictatorial mechanism
under both welfare criteria, as one can check numerically.
11Our definition of a mechanism in Section 2 rules out randomization. If randomization is allowed, then
randomization can be used to construct anonymous voting mechanisms.
12The uniform distribution over utility functions is constructed by first picking one of the six possible linear
orders of three alternatives, where each order has probability 1/6, and then picking a number x between 0 and
1 from the uniform distribution, assigning utility x to the middle alternative, and utilities 1 (resp. 0) to the top
(resp. bottom) alternative. As the discussion of voting incentives in mechanism A has shown, the only aspect
of agents’ first-order beliefs that matters for their choices is the relative likelihood of the other agent having
a weak or strong preference for b over c. We take the “uniform distribution over first-order beliefs” to be the
distribution where this likelihood is the ratio of two numbers both independently and uniformly drawn from
the interval from 0 to 1. Finally, utilities and beliefs are drawn independently.
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Mechanism B: To save space, we keep this discussion shorter than the discussion of
mechanism A. Mechanism B is similar to mechanism A, but it is not anonymous. In mech-
anism B, only agent 1 (the row player) can differentiate between a weak or a strong vote
for b, and only agent 2 (the column player) can differentiate between a weak or a strong
vote for c. The voting rules are then similar to the voting rules in mechanism A. In this
mechanism, if an agent ranks a or b highest, then she has weakly dominant strategies.
Furthermore, if agent 1 has a weak preference for c over b, that is, cR1bR1a, then a weak
vote for c is weakly dominant. If agent 2 has a strong preference for c over b, that is,
cR2aR2b, then a strong vote for c is weakly dominant.
Thus, we only have two cases with multiple not weakly dominated strategies. Agent 1
has two undominated strategies when she has a strong preference for c over b, that is,
cRiaRib: voting for a and voting for c. This reflects that she cannot cast a strong vote for
c, unlike in mechanism A. Agent 2 has two undominated strategies when she has a weak
preference for c over b. As in mechanism A, she might cast a weak or a strong vote for c
in this case.
Notice that in no case higher-order beliefs matter for an agent’s choice. Agent 1 with a
strong preference for c over b only cares about the probability of agent 2 voting for b and
the total probability of agent 2 voting for c. In other words, agent 1 does not care about
the exact probability of agent 2 casting a weak or strong vote for c. Higher-order beliefs
do not matter for agent 2 with a weak preference for c over b, because whether agent 1
casts a weak or strong vote for b does not depend on agent 1’s first-order beliefs. Thus,
the mechanism is strategically simple.
REMARK 4: So far in the voting problem, we have considered the domain in which
there is no restriction regarding the agents’ utilities or beliefs: Ui = U and Mi = (Un−1)
for all i ∈ I. A common domain restriction for preferences in the voting literature is the
so-called single-peaked domain. In our context, a single-peaked domain would be one for
which there is an ordering of the alternatives in A so that, for all i, all utility functions
in Ui are single-peaked, and the set Mi is the set of all beliefs that assign probability 1
to single-peaked utility functions. It is easy to see that the first mechanism in Proposition
3 is type 2 strategically simple even in the single-peaked domain when the alternatives
are arranged in alphabetical order, whereas the second mechanism is type 1 strategically
simple on the single-peaked domain.
6. RELATED LITERATURE
Li (2017) proposed the concept of “obviously strategy-proof mechanisms.” These mech-
anisms form a subclass of dominant strategy mechanisms in which it is particularly easy
for agents to recognize that they have a dominant strategy. While Li’s work is, in spirit, re-
lated to ours, our purpose is to introduce a class of mechanisms that is larger (rather than
smaller) than the class of dominant strategy mechanisms, yet consists only of “simple”
mechanisms. Our motivation for this is that, in many applications, the set of dominant
strategy mechanisms seems “too small.”
Li observed that subjects in experiments often do not recognize dominant strategies,
but that they do recognize such strategies if the mechanism is “obviously strategy-proof.”
But if subjects in experiments don’t even recognize dominant strategies when they are not
obvious, then how can we expect them to engage in the strategic reasoning that we have
called “strategically simple” in this paper?
We argue that Li captures a different dimension of “simplicity” than we do. In dominant
strategy mechanisms, and arguably also in strategically simple mechanisms, the “logic”
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that underlies the determination of an optimal strategy is straightforward. By this we
mean that the logic can be explained to the agents in a simple and persuasive way. This is
presumably a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for optimal choices to be “obvious”
in the sense that agents can easily find optimal strategies by themselves, without being
offered explanations. In practice, it seems common that mechanism designers spend a
lot of time explaining to the participants in the mechanism how the mechanism works,
and which considerations the participants should base their strategic choices on. Strategic
simplicity implies that the mechanism designer can present a simple and persuasive ex-
planation of the relevant strategic considerations to the agents. That does not mean that
the optimal choices are “obvious” to the agents.
Several recent papers have analyzed mechanism design when agents’ strategy choices
are guided by “level-k thinking.”13 Like our paper, the level-k model of strategic choice is
motivated by the idea that there is an upper bound on the length of hierarchies of beliefs
that agents can form. We assume in this paper that k is equal to 2. The level-k model
relies, however, on an exogenous “anchor” that describes the beliefs of an agent who does
not analyze the other agents’ incentives at all, but who does maximize expected utility
(“level-1 agents”). This amounts to selecting among the not strictly dominated strategies
of level-1 agents those that are best responses to a particular belief. We select the not
weakly dominated strategies, and thus implicitly assume full support beliefs, but do not fix
any specific anchor belief. Thus, our theory of behavior is, in most games, more permissive
than the level-k model of behavior.
Particularly closely related to our work is a paper by De Clippel, Saran, and Serrano
(2019). They considered an incomplete information environment with a common prior
type space. The mechanism designer seeks to implement a social choice function that as-
signs to each type vector one outcome. They studied a mechanism designer who believes
that each agent i is a level-ki(≥ 1) player, but who does not know the levels ki. Imple-
mentation is achieved if, for each type vector, the desired outcome results whenever each
player i is a level-ki player for any combination of ki’s. This implies that players with a
level ki ≥ 2 anticipate the same outcome regardless of which level the other players are,
and therefore that there is no benefit to a player of thinking beyond level 2, just as in
our paper. However, unlike our paper, de Clippel et al.’s postulated an exogenous an-
chor, worked with a common prior, and focused on social choice functions rather than
correspondences.
Our work is also related to papers that consider the implementation of social choice
functions when agents perform a limited number of rounds of elimination of dominated
strategies. Saran’s (2016) implementation notion includes the requirement that any strat-
egy combination that survives one round of elimination of strictly undominated strate-
gies yields the outcome prescribed by the social choice function. He obtained for many
economic environments that a strict subset of the set of all strategy-proof social choice
functions can be implemented. By comparison, in our model, agents are assumed to be
able to perform first-order strategic thinking. Another difference is that we allow for the
elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
Jackson, Palfrey, and Srivastava (1994) and Sjöström (1994) showed that, in certain
economic environments, all social choice functions can be implemented in two rounds of
elimination of weakly dominated strategies, with a unique strategy surviving in round two.
Thus, the corresponding mechanisms are strategically simple on the restricted domain in
13De Clippel, Saran, and Serrano (2019), Crawford (2016), Gorelkina (2018), Kneeland (2017).
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which agents have point beliefs about the other agents’ preferences. This paper considers
strategic simplicity on larger domains.
In complete information models, De Clippel, Eliaz, and Knight (2014) and Van der
Linden (2017) used the number of rounds of elimination of dominated strategies, or of
backward induction, that are required to solve a mechanism as a measure of the strategic
complexity of mechanisms for the choice of an arbitrator or of a jury. This idea is closely
related to our notion of strategic simplicity. One important difference with our work is
that they do not allow uncertainty about other agents’ preferences.
Bahel and Sprumont (2017) considered dominant strategy mechanisms for the choice
among Savage acts. The act that is chosen by the mechanism may depend on each agent’s
beliefs about the state, but it will not depend on any agent’s beliefs about the other agents’
beliefs about the state, etc. This is because, for given beliefs and valuations, their mech-
anisms have dominant strategies. There is thus a parallel between their work and ours,
although, in their work, beliefs are about Savage-style “states of the world,” whereas in
our work, beliefs are about other agents’ preferences.
Strategic simplicity can also be interpreted as a form of robustness in the sense of
Bergemann and Morris (2005). Whereas Bergemann and Morris studied implementation
that does not rely on any conditions on agents’ hierarchies of beliefs, we study implemen-
tation of outcomes that may depend on agents’ first-order beliefs, but not on higher-order
beliefs.
7. DISCUSSION
In this section, we suggest some directions for further research. One objective for fur-
ther research is to develop a deeper understanding of type 2 strategically simple mecha-
nisms in general and in particular environments. Another interesting research direction
on type 2 strategically simple mechanisms would be to seek general conditions on prim-
itives that imply that all strategically simple mechanisms are of type 1. We provided one
such environment in this paper, namely, the bilateral trade environment. Our proof in the
bilateral trade environment relies heavily on the particular domain structure, and we have
not yet found useful ways to generalize the result to other settings. Finally, it might be in-
teresting to define a refinement of strategic simplicity that is satisfied by all mechanisms
that we call “type 1 strategically simple,” but not by any mechanism that we call “type 2
strategically simple.”
Strategic simplicity as defined in this paper focuses on mechanisms in which the agents’
optimal choices can be based on first-order beliefs alone. It would be interesting to in-
vestigate mechanisms in which there is some integer k ≥ 2 such that only beliefs up to
the kth order matter for agents’ choices. A characterization of such mechanisms might
be particularly difficult to find when considering the analog of what we have called in
this paper “type 2” strategically simple mechanisms. However, even the generalization of
type 1 strategically mechanisms seems non-trivial. Consider the following example: There
are three agents that vote over four alternatives. The three agents in turn remove one
alternative from consideration, and the remaining alternative is chosen. This is a simple
extension of type 1 strategically simple voting mechanisms, and one might conjecture that
the highest-order beliefs that matter for optimal choice in this mechanism are the second-
order beliefs. Obviously, the agent who moves last does not have to form any beliefs. One
might conjecture that the agent who moves second only has to form first-order belief, and
that the agent who moves first only has to form second-order belief. However, this con-
jecture is wrong. The reason is that the second mover needs to form second-order belief
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about the correlation between the first mover’s belief and the third mover’s preference,
and therefore, for the first mover, it matters what he believes about the second-order
belief of the second mover. We have not yet tackled the complex issues raised by this
example, but hope to do so in future research.
A study of strategically simple mechanisms in applications other than the two settings
covered in this paper would be interesting. For certain classes of environments with quasi-
linear preferences, mechanisms in which agents need to form at most first-order beliefs to
determine their expected utility maximizing strategies have been described in Chen and
Li (2018), Yamashita and Zhu (2018), and Crémer and Riordan (1985). The first two pa-
pers showed that such strategically simple mechanisms dominate the optimal dominant
strategy mechanism for a revenue maximizing mechanism designer, and Crémer and Ri-
ordan (1985) focused on efficiency properties. While strategic simplicity is not the focus of
these papers, their results suggest that a further study of strategically simple mechanisms
in environments with quasi-linear preferences might be promising.
Future research might also develop criteria which a mechanism designer could use to
evaluate strategically simple mechanisms, and then characterize using such criteria the
best strategically simple mechanisms. The simplest way of proceeding would be to endow
the mechanism designer with a prior over agents’ utility functions and their first-order
beliefs, and then to maximize the expected value of the designer’s objective function. In
this paper, we have conducted such an exercise when comparing the expected welfare
from a type 2 strategically simple voting mechanism and a dictatorial voting mechanism.
The comparison is based on a uniform prior. An interesting open research question is
whether, in the voting context, and in general, results can be obtained that do not rely on
the ad hoc specification of a prior.
Finally, experimental tests of our notion of strategic simplicity would be of interest. We
argued in the previous section that, in strategically simple mechanisms, the “logic” that
underlies the determination of an optimal strategy is straightforward, although it might
not be obvious. To address the possibility that experimental subjects might not discover by
themselves what is not obvious, the experimenter might explain it to them. A comparison
between the subjects’ understanding and acceptance of the experimenter’s explanations
in strategically simple mechanisms and in mechanisms that are not strategically simple
might serve as a test of our concept of strategic simplicity.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first show that mechanisms that satisfy the conditions in the theorem are strategi-
cally simple. Fix an agent i ∈ I, any utility function ui ∈Ui, and any utility belief μi ∈Mi.
We have to show that agent i has a strategy that is a best response to all compatible strate-
gic beliefs.
Let Ri denote the preference induced by ui. It suffices to show that there is a strategy in
UDi(Ri) that is among the strategies in UDi(Ri) a best response to all compatible strategic
beliefs. By the definition of weak dominance given Ri, the same strategy will then also be
among all strategies of agent i a best response to all compatible strategic beliefs.
We can classify the profiles of utility functions u−i of agents other than i into two cat-
egories: (1) the ones that induce preference profile R−i such that agent i is a local dicta-
tor in the mechanism restricted to the strategy set UDi(Ri) for agent i and strategy sets
UD−i(R−i) for the other agents; and (2) the ones that induce preference profile R−i such
that agent i is not a local dictator in this mechanism. In the first case, the outcome is de-
termined by agent i’s own choice from UDi(Ri) regardless of which strategies in UD(R−i)
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the other agents choose, and with utility function u−i all undominated strategies of the
other agents will be contained in UD−i(R−i). In the second case, the outcome is the same
regardless of agent i’s own choice from UDi(Ri) as long as the other agents choose strate-
gies in UD−i(R−i), and, again, with utility function u−i all undominated strategies of the
other agents will be contained in UD−i(R−i). Thus, agent i’s expected utility maximizing
choice from UDi(Ri) only depends on her utility belief, and is the same for all compatible
strategic beliefs, and we can conclude that the mechanism is strategically simple.
Next, we show that mechanisms that are strategically simple with respect to domains
described in the theorem must satisfy the conditions in the theorem. We proceed by es-
tablishing a sequence of claims.
CLAIM A.1: Let ui ∈Ui, u−i ∈U−i, and let μi ∈Mi be a utility belief such that μi({u−i}) >
0. Suppose si s′i ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi) BRi(ui μˆi). Then for all s−i s
′
−i ∈UD−i(u−i),
ui
(
g(si s−i)
)− ui(g(s′i s−i))= ui(g(si s′−i))− ui(g(s′i s′−i))
PROOF: Suppose the assertion were not true. Then there are s−i s′−i ∈UD−i(u−i) such
that
ui
(
g(si s−i)
)− ui(g(s′i s−i))> ui(g(si s′−i))− ui(g(s′i s′−i))
Pick any μˆi ∈ Mi(μi) that places strictly positive probability on s−i and s′−i. Because si
and s′i are both in BRi(ui μˆi), both strategies must yield the same expected utility under
μˆi. Now suppose we vary μˆi such that it places ε probability more than μˆi on s−i and
ε probability less than μˆi on s′−i, leaving all other probabilities unchanged. If we choose
ε > 0 and sufficiently small, we can vary μˆi in this way so that it remains an element of
Mi(μi), and so that for the modified belief si is a strictly better response than s′i. This
contradicts s′i ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi) BRi(ui μˆi). Q.E.D.
CLAIM A.2: Let ui ∈Ui, u−i ∈U−i, and let μiμ′i ∈Mi be any two utility beliefs such that
μi({u−i}) > 0 and μ′i({u−i}) > 0. Suppose
si ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi)
BRi(ui μˆi) and
s′i ∈
⋂
μˆ′i∈Mi(μ′i)
BRi
(
ui μˆ
′
i
)

Then for all s−i s′−i ∈UD−i(u−i),
ui
(
g(si s−i)
)− ui(g(s′i s−i))= ui(g(si s′−i))− ui(g(s′i s′−i))
PROOF: We focus on the non-trivial case: si = s′i. Claim A.2 follows from repeated
applications of Claim A.1 if we can find a sequence of utility beliefs of agent i, μki
(k = 2    K), and strategies of agent i, ski (k = 12    K), where K ≥ 2, such that
s1i = si, sKi = s′i, for every k ∈ {2    K} the utility belief μki places positive probability on
u−i, and for every k ∈ {2    K} both sk−1i and ski are elements of
⋂
μˆki ∈Mi(μki ) BRi(ui μˆ
k
i ).
We shall construct such a sequence.
For every α ∈ [01], we define μi(α) ≡ (1 − α)μi + αμ′i. We set s1i = si. Define α2 ≡
sup{α ∈ [01]|s1i ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(α)) BRi(ui μˆi)}. Observe that the upper hemi-continuity of
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the best response correspondence implies that s1i ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(α2)) BRi(ui μˆi). If α
2 = 1,
then we can set s2i = s′i, μ2i = μ′i, K = 2, and our sequence has all the required properties.
If α2 < 1, define s2i to be any strategy in Si that is an element of
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(α2+ε))
BRi(ui μˆi)
for a sequence of ε > 0 tending to zero. Then, by upper hemi-continuity of the correspon-
dence of best responses, s2i ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(α2)) BRi(ui μˆi). We define μ
2
i to be μi(α
2). Note
that, because μi and μ′i attach strictly positive probability to u−i, and because μ
2
i is a con-
vex combination of μi and μ′i, also μ
2
i places strictly positive probability on u−i. If s
2
i = s′i,
then we set K = 2, and the construction is complete.
If s2i = s′i, then we repeat the steps just described. In general, let k≥ 2, and suppose that,
after k − 1 steps, we had determined μki such that μki = μi(αk) for some αk < 1, and ski
such that ski = s′i. Then, repeating the steps described above means that we define αk+1 ≡
sup{α ∈ [αk1]|ski ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(α)) BRi(ui μˆi)}. By the upper hemi-continuity of the best
response correspondence: ski ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(αk+1)) BRi(ui μˆi). If α
k+1 = 1, then we can define
sk+1i = s′i, μk+1i = μ′i, K = k+ 1, and our sequence has the required properties. If αk+1 < 1,
define sk+1i to be a strategy in Si that is an element of
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(αk+1+ε)) BRi(ui μˆi) for a
sequence of ε > 0 tending to zero. By the upper hemi-continuity of the correspondence
of best responses, sk+1i ∈
⋂
μˆi∈Mi(μi(αk+1)) BRi(ui μˆi). We define μ
k+1
i to be μi(αk+1). Note
that μk+1i places strictly positive probability on u−i. If s
k+1
i = s′i, then we set K = k+ 1, and
the construction is complete. Otherwise, we continue as before.
Note that by construction, in the sequence of strategies, no strategy is ever repeated.
Because the number of strategies is finite, the construction has to end after a finite number
of steps. At that point, our sequence will have all the required properties. Q.E.D.
CLAIM A.3: For every agent i, for every preference Ri ∈ Ri on A, there exists a utility
function u∗i that represents Ri, such that, for every si ∈ UDi(Ri), there is a strategic belief μˆi
with support equal to S−i such that
BRi
(
u∗i  μˆi
)= {si}
Moreover, the utility function u∗i can be chosen such that u
∗
i (a)− u∗i (b) = u∗i (c)− u∗i (d) for
all (ab) (cd) ∈A2 with (ab) = (cd).
PROOF: First note that, if we can find a utility function u∗i with the property in the
first sentence of Claim A.3, then we can slightly perturb this utility function so that the
property in the first sentence is maintained, but also the condition in the second sentence
of Claim A.3 holds. Therefore, it is sufficient to prove only the first sentence of Claim A.3.
By the lemma, and the remark in the first paragraph of the proof of that lemma, in Börg-
ers (1993), for every strategy si ∈UDi(Ri) there exist a utility function usi that represents
Ri, and a full support strategic belief μˆi, such that si is the unique maximizer of expected
utility given that belief. To prove Claim A.3, it therefore only remains to be shown that
the utility functions usi can be chosen to be the same for all strategies si ∈UDi(Ri).
We begin with the following observation: Suppose that si is the unique maximizer of
expected utility in Si for utility function ui and full support strategic belief μˆi, and suppose
that f :R→ R is strictly increasing and concave. We claim that then there is another full
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support strategic belief ˆˆμi such that si is the unique maximizer of expected utility for the
utility function f ◦ ui. To see this, note first that, because si maximizes expected utility
for a full support belief if utility is ui, it is not weakly dominated given utility function
ui. Next, because f is increasing and concave, si is not weakly dominated given utility
function f ◦ui, either. This follows directly from the argument in the proof of Proposition
1 in Weinstein (2016). We can now use Lemma 4 in Pearce (1984) and conclude that there
is some full support strategic belief ˆˆμi of agent i such that si maximizes expected utility
when the utility function is f ◦ ui. It remains to be shown that this belief can be chosen
such that si is the unique maximizer of expected utility. We do this in the next paragraph.
Because si is the unique maximizer of expected utility for some full support belief if the
utility function is ui, by Theorem 2.3 in Bertsimas and Tsitsiklis (1997), the utility vector
(ui(si s−i))s−i∈S−i ∈R|S−i | is an extreme point of the convex hull of the set of all such utility
vectors:
co
({(
ui
(
s′i s−i
))
s−i∈S−i |s
′
i ∈ Si
})

We now claim that the utility vector corresponding to si remains an extreme point
if we apply an increasing and concave transformation to ui. That is, we claim that
(f (ui(si s−i)))s−i∈S−i ∈R|S−i | is an extreme point of
co
({(
f
(
ui
(
s′i s−i
)))
s−i∈S−i |s
′
i ∈ Si
})

Suppose it were not. Then (f (ui(si s−i)))s−i∈S−i could be written as a convex combination
of the elements of {(f (ui(s′i s−i)))s−i∈S−i |s′i ∈ Si s′i = si}, that is, there would be a mixed
strategy σi ∈ (Si) of agent i that attaches zero probability to si, and such that
(
f
(
ui(si s−i)
))
s−i∈S−i =
∑
s′i∈Si
(
f
(
ui
(
s′i s−i
)))
s−i∈S−iσi
(
s′i
)

Because f is strictly concave, this implies
(
ui(si s−i)
)
s−i∈S−i 
(
ui(σi s−i)
)
s−i∈S−i 
which contradicts that si is not weakly dominated for utility function ui. We conclude that
(f (ui(si s−i)))s−i∈S−i ∈ R|S−i | is an extreme point. Using again Theorem 2.3 in Bertsimas
and Tsitsiklis (1997), this implies that there is some function ξ : S−i →R such that si is the
unique maximizer of
∑
s−i∈S−i ξ(s−i)f (ui(si s−i)) in Si. Let us treat ξ as a vector in R
|S−i |.
One can verify that there must be a small ball around ξ such that, for every vector ξ˜ in
this ball, si is the unique maximizer of
∑
s−i∈S−i ξ˜(s−i)f (ui(si s−i)). We can pick from this
ball some ξ˜ such that
∑
s−i∈S−i ξ˜(s−i) = 0. Now consider the vector μ˜i defined by
μ˜i(s−i)≡
ˆˆμi + ε ξ˜(s−i)∑
s′−i∈S−i
ξ˜
(
s′−i
)
1 + ε
for all s−i ∈ S−i. For sufficiently small ε > 0, this is a strategic belief. It is a convex com-
bination of ˆˆμi, for which si is an expected utility maximizer, and of ξ˜, for which si is the
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unique maximizer of
∑
s−i∈S−i ξ˜(s−i)f (ui(si s−i)) in Si. Therefore, si is the unique expected
utility maximizer for the strategic belief μ˜i.
We can now complete the proof by showing that there are a utility function u∗i and,
for every si ∈ UDi(Ri), a concave function fsi : R → R, such that u∗i = fsi(usi) for all si ∈
UDi(Ri). We first construct u∗i . Enumerate the elements of A as a1 a2     aL such that
aLRiaL−1RiaL−2Ri   Ria1. We pick u∗i to satisfy the following, where the first two lines
are a normalization:
u∗i (a1)= 0
u∗i (a2)= 1
· · ·
u∗i (a−1) < u
∗
i (a) < u
∗
i (a−1)+ · · · +
(
u∗i (a−1)− u∗i (a−2)
)
min
si∈UDi(Ri)
usi (a)− usi(a−1)
usi(a−1)− usi(a−2)

Note that the right-most term in the inequality is strictly larger than the left term, so
that u∗i can be constructed, and will be monotonically increasing, and thus compatible
with Ri.
We now turn to the construction of the functions fsi . For every si, we set fsi(usi(a)) =
u∗i (a) for all  = 12    L. This defines fsi for a finite number of elements of R only.
However, it is clear that we can extend fsi to a concave piecewise linear function on R if
it satisfies the following concavity condition for the points in which it is defined:
fsi
(
usi(a)
)− fsi(usi(a−1))
usi(a)− usi(a−1)
≤ fsi
(
usi(a−1)
)− fsi(usi(a−2))
usi(a−1)− usi(a−2)
for all ≥ 2. By the definition of fsi , this inequality is equivalent to
u∗i (a)− u∗i (a−1)
usi(a)− usi(a−1)
≤ u
∗
i (a−1)− u∗i (a−2)
usi(a−1)− usi(a−2)
⇔ u∗i (a)≤ u∗i (a−1)+ · · · +
(
u∗i (a−1)− u∗i (a−2)
) usi(a)− usi(a−1)
usi(a−1)− usi(a−2)

which holds by construction. Q.E.D.
CLAIM A.4: For every agent i, for every preference Ri ∈Ri on A, and for every u−i ∈U−i,
either
(i) there is, for every strategy si ∈UD(Ri), an alternative a such that g(si s−i)= a for all
s−i ∈UD−i(u−i),
or
(ii) there is, for every strategy combination s−i ∈ UD−i(u−i), an alternative a such that
g(si s−i)= a for all si ∈UDi(Ri),
or both.
PROOF: Let us represent Ri by the utility function u∗i from Claim A.3. Pick any two
si s
′
i ∈ UDi(Ri). By Claim A.3, there are a full support strategic belief μˆi such that
BRi(u
∗
i  μˆi) = {si}, and a full support strategic belief μˆ′i such that BRi(u∗i  μˆ′i) = {si}. Be-
cause μˆi has full support, and because every strategy is undominated for at least some
2026 T. BÖRGERS AND J. LI
utility function, there is a utility belief μi with μi(u−i) > 0 that is compatible with μˆi. Sim-
ilarly, there is a utility belief μ′i with μ
′
i(u−i) > 0 that is compatible with μˆ
′
i. This implies
si ∈⋂μˆi∈Mi(μi) BRi(ui μˆi) and s′i ∈⋂μˆ′i∈Mi(μ′i) BRi(ui μˆ′i). Therefore, by Claim A.2 for all
s−i s′−i ∈UD−i(u−i),
u∗i
(
g(si s−i)
)− u∗i (g(s′i s−i))= u∗i (g(si s′−i))− u∗i (g(s′i s′−i)) (*)
This has to hold for any two si s′i ∈UDi(Ri).
Now let us fix some si ∈ UDi(Ri), and suppose first that, for some a ∈ A, we have
g(si s−i) = a for all s−i ∈ UD−i(u−i). Then (*) implies that, for every other s′i ∈ UDi(Ri),
there must be some a˜ ∈ A such that g(si s−i) = a˜ for all s−i ∈ UD−i(u−i). This follows
from u∗i (a) − u∗i (b) = u∗i (c) − u∗i (d) for all (ab) (cd) ∈ A2 with (ab) = (cd). Thus,
we have obtained Case (i).
Next suppose that, for the si that we fixed in the previous paragraph, we have g(si s−i) =
g(si s
′
−i) for some s−i s
′
−i ∈ UD−i(u−i). Then u∗i (a) − u∗i (b) = u∗i (c) − u∗i (d) for all
(ab) (cd) ∈ A2 with (ab) = (cd) implies that (*) can only hold if both sides equal
zero, and hence g(si s−i)= g(s′i s−i) for all si s′i ∈UDi(Ri) and all s−i ∈UD−i(R−i). Thus,
we have obtained Case (ii). Q.E.D.
CLAIM A.5: Suppose, for every agent j, we have a preferenceRj ∈Rj onA. Then, for every
agent i, either
(i) there is, for every strategy si ∈UD(Ri), an alternative a such that g(si s−i)= a for all
s−i ∈UD−i(R−i),
or
(ii) there is, for every strategy combination s−i ∈ UD−i(R−i), an alternative a such that
g(si s−i)= a for all si ∈UDi(Ri),
or both.
PROOF: Claim A.5 follows from Claim A.4 if we represent for each j with j = i
the preference Rj by the utility function u∗j referred to in Claim A.3, because then
UD−i(u∗−i)=UD−i(R−i). Q.E.D.
COMPLETING THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1: The claim is obviously true if there is an
alternative a such that g(s) = a for all s ∈ UD(R). Therefore, from now on, we restrict
attention in this proof to the case that there are two alternatives a = b such that g(s)= a
for some s ∈UD(R) and g(s′)= b for some other s′ ∈UD(R).
We shall say that agent i ∈ I “has no influence” if, for every s−i ∈UD−i(R−i), there is an
a ∈A such that g(si s−i)= a for all si ∈UDi(Ri), and we shall say that agent i is a dictator
if agent i has the property ascribed to agent i∗ in Theorem 1. By Claim A.5, every agent i
either has no influence, or is a dictator.
Next, note that it cannot be that there is more than one dictator. A dictator can enforce
any of the alternatives contained in {g(s)|s ∈UD(R)}. We have assumed that there are at
least two such alternatives, say a and b. Having two dictators leads to a contradiction if
one of them chooses an action that enforces a, and the other one chooses an action that
enforces b.
Finally, note that it cannot be that all agents have no influence. Recall that we are
considering the case in which there are two alternatives a = b such that g(s)= a for some
s ∈UD(R) and g(s′)= b for some other s′ ∈UD(R). Consider the sequence of n strategy
combinations sk obtained by switching sequentially first agent 1, then agent 2, etc., from
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strategy si to strategy s′i. Thus, s
1 = (s′1 s2     sn), s2 = (s′1 s′2 s3     sn), etc. Define s0 = s.
Because g(s0) = g(sn), there must be some k such that g(sk) = g(sk−1). But this means
that, by construction, agent k has influence. Hence agent k must be a dictator.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Part (1) of Theorem 2 is obvious. Here, we only provide the proof for part (2). Consider
a type 1 strategically simple mechanism, and let
i∗ ∈
⋂
R∈×i∈IRi
I∗(R)
We shall show that, for all i = i∗ and all Ri ∈Ri, the set UDi(Ri) contains exactly one
element. Suppose that, for some i and Ri, the set UDi(Ri) had two distinct elements,
say si and s′i. Consider any s−i ∈ S−i. We claim that g(si s−i) = g(s′i s−i). To see this,
first note that s−i ∈ UD−i(R−i) for some R−i ∈×j =iRj , because we assume that every
strategy is not weakly dominated for some utility function. Now consider the prefer-
ence profile (RiR−i). Since agent i∗ is local dictator for this preference profile, for any
s∗i ∈ UDi∗(Ri∗), there is an a ∈ A such that g(si∗ s−i∗) = a for all s−i∗ ∈ UD−i∗(R−i∗). This
implies g(si∗ si s−(i∗i)) = g(si∗ s′i s−(i∗i)) for all s−(i∗i) ∈ UD−(i∗i)(R−(i∗i)). As this holds
for all s∗i ∈ UDi∗ , the assertion follows. But this contradicts our assumption that mecha-
nisms do not have duplicate strategies.
Fix any si∗ ∈ Si∗ , and consider the mechanism in which we have removed agent i∗ from
the set of agents, in which all other agents have the same strategy sets as originally, that is,
Sj , and in which the outcome corresponding to any s−i∗ is given by g(si∗ s−i∗). Let us call
this mechanism the “restricted mechanism” corresponding to si∗ . If all agents j = i play
the strategies that are uniquely dominant in the overall mechanism, then the restricted
mechanism implements an outcome function Fsi∗ :U−i ×M−i →A. Because, in the over-
all mechanism, agents have dominant strategies, the outcome correspondence is constant
with respect to beliefs, and it is also constant if utility functions are changed without
changing the order of the elements of A. We can therefore write F as Fsi∗ :×j =i∗ Rj →A.
We can treat this outcome function as a direct mechanism. Because agents choose domi-
nant strategies in the overall mechanism, in the direct mechanism it is a dominant strategy
for each agent to report their preferences truthfully.
Because, in the overall mechanism, agents have uniquely dominant strategies, they must
have for every preference ordering a strategy that induces in each of the restricted mech-
anisms a dominant strategy. Agent i∗ thus expects, for each of the strategies that he can
choose, the same outcome distribution as he would in the sequential mechanism described
in Theorem 2, if the second stage mechanisms are the restricted mechanisms described
by the outcome function Fsi∗ . Agent i
∗ will make the same choice in the sequential mech-
anism as in the given type 1 strategically simple mechanism. This implies part (2) of The-
orem 2.
APPENDIX C: FURTHER PROPERTIES OF STRATEGICALLY SIMPLE MECHANISMS
In this section of the appendix, we provide some general properties of strategically sim-
ple mechanisms that will be useful for the proofs of our results for the bilateral trade and
the voting applications. This section’s results rely on the domain assumptions in Theorem
1, but they are not restricted to the applications, and therefore also complement the main
text’s results on strategically simple mechanisms in general.
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Before we turn to our results on strategically simple mechanisms, we record a simple
observation that is a direct implication of the notion of weak dominance, and that is un-
related to strategic simplicity.
LEMMA 1: Let i ∈ I, RiR′i ∈Ri, and si ∈ UDi(Ri). Then there exists s′i ∈ UDi(R′i) such
that, for all s−i ∈ S−i,
g
(
s′i s−i
)
R′ig(si s−i)
PROOF: If si ∈UDi(R′i), the lemma is true if we set s′i = si. If si /∈UDi(R′i), because we
are considering finite mechanisms, there is some s′′i ∈ UDi(R′i) that weakly dominates si,
and the lemma follows if we set s′i = s′′i . Q.E.D.
For the main results of this section of the appendix, we need some additional notation.
For each i ∈ I and each s−i ∈ S−i, let
Mi(s−i)≡
{
g(si s−i)|si ∈ Si
}
and
bi(s−iRi)≡ arg max
Ri
Mi(s−i)
In words, Mi(s−i) is the set of all possible outcomes when agent i’s opponents choose s−i,
and bi(s−iRi) is agent i’s most preferred outcome in the set Mi(s−i) if agent i’s preference
is Ri. In this paper, we say that Mi(s−i) is the “menu” offered to agent i if the other agents
choose s−i.
LEMMA 2: Consider a strategically simple mechanism under the domain assumptions in
Theorem 1. Suppose that, for some R−i ∈R−i, the set UD−i(R−i) has at least two elements.
Let Ri ∈Ri.
(1) Suppose that, for some s′−i s
′′
−i ∈ UD−i(R−i), we have bi(s′−iRi) = bi(s′′−iRi). Then,
for all s−i ∈UD−i(R−i) and all si ∈UDi(Ri),
g(si s−i)= bi(s−iRi)
(2) Suppose that, for some s′−i s
′′
−i ∈UD−i(R−i), we have bi(s′−iRi)= bi(s′′−iRi)= a for
some outcome a. Then there exists some strategy si ∈UDi(Ri) such that
g
(
si s
′
−i
)= g(si s′′−i)= a
Moreover, for all si ∈UDi(Ri), we have
g
(
si s
′
−i
)= g(si s′′−i)
In words, this lemma says the following. Consider any agent i. Consider any preference
profile for which at least one agent other than i has more than one undominated strategy.
Each of the profiles of undominated strategies of the other agents offers a menu to agent
i, and from each of these menus we can determine the outcome that agent i prefers most.
In case (1), agent i’s preferred alternative is different for two such menus. In this case,
all undominated strategies of agent i must yield agent i’s most preferred alternative from
the menu offered by the other agents for all undominated strategy profiles of the other
agents. In case (2), agent i’s preferred alternative is the same for two such menus. In
this case, some, but not all undominated strategies of agent i must yield agent i’s most
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preferred alternative from the menu offered by the other agents. In case (2), every other
undominated strategy of agent i must, however, yield the same outcome, regardless of
which undominated strategy profile the other agents choose.
PROOF: (1) Without loss of generality, let bi(s′−iRi) = a and bi(s′′−iRi) = b. Also
without loss of generality, we assume that Ri ranks a above b. Therefore, a /∈ Mi(s′′−i).
By Lemma 1, agent i has an undominated strategy s′i such that g(s
′
i s
′
−i) = a. Because
a /∈ Mi(s′′−i), we know that g(s′i s′′−i) = a. This means that agent i is not the local dictator,
and hence some agent other than agent i must be the local dictator. That is, for every
strategy s−i ∈ UD−i(R−i), the outcome is independent of agent i’s strategy si ∈ UDi(Ri).
Moreover, by Lemma 1, the outcome has to be agent i’s most preferred outcome in the
set Mi(s−i).
(2) Suppose that there is no strategy si ∈ UDi(Ri) such that g(si s′−i) = g(si s′′−i) = a.
Since bi(s′−iRi)= a, by Lemma 1, there must be some s′i ∈UDi(Ri) such that g(s′i s′−i)=
a. Hence, g(s′i s
′′
−i) = a. This means that agent i is not the local dictator, and hence some
agent other than agent i must be the local dictator. This implies that g(si s′′−i) = a for
all si ∈ UDi(Ri). But this contradicts that bi(s′′−iRi) = a and Lemma 1. Thus, we can
conclude that there exists some strategy si ∈UDi(Ri) such that g(si s′−i)= g(si s′′−i)= a.
Now, either for all si ∈UDi(Ri) we also have g(si s′−i)= g(si s′′−i)= a, in which case the
second part of the assertion obviously holds, or there exists some undominated strategy
that sometimes yields an outcome other than a if her opponents choose s′−i or s
′′
−i. In
the latter case, agent i must be the local dictator, and the second part of the assertion
follows. Q.E.D.
Part (2) of the above lemma has a simple implication. Suppose there are just two agents,
and suppose that agent −i with some preferences R−i has at least two undominated strate-
gies. Then each of the undominated strategies must offer a different menu to agent i.
COROLLARY 2: Suppose n = 2, and consider a strategically simple mechanism under the
domain assumptions of Theorem 1. Suppose that, for some R−i ∈R−i, the set UD−i(R−i) has
at least two elements. If s′−i s
′′
−i ∈UD−i(R−i) and s′−i = s′′−i, then
Mi
(
s′−i
) =Mi(s′′−i)
PROOF: The proof is indirect. If Mi(s′−i)=Mi(s′′−i), then bi(s′−iRi)= bi(s′′−iRi) for all
Ri ∈Ri. Therefore, case (2) of Lemma 2 applies, and for any strategy of agent i that is
undominated for some preference (in other words, for all strategies of agent i), s′−i and
s′′−i yield the same outcome. They are thus duplicate strategies. But this contradicts our
assumption that the mechanism does not contain any duplicate strategies. Q.E.D.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
To simplify the notation, we shall use “vi” not just to refer to agent i’s value of the object,
but also to refer to the corresponding ordinal preference. We use UDi(vi) to denote the
set of strategies of agent i that are not weakly dominated if agent i has ordinal preference
vi. We use I∗(vS vB) to denote the set of local dictators at preference profile (vS vB).
Finally, for any (vS vB), we denote by O(vS vB) the set of outcomes that can arise when
both agents play strategies that are not weakly dominated given their valuations. That is,
O(vS vB)≡ {a ∈A|a= g(sS sB) for some sS ∈UDS(vS) and sB ∈UDB(vB)}.
2030 T. BÖRGERS AND J. LI
We now prove four claims that will be useful in the proof of the proposition. These
claims describe implications of strategic simplicity in the bilateral trade setting, regardless
of whether we are referring to type 1 or type 2 strategic simplicity.
CLAIM D.1: If I∗(vS vB)= {SB}, then |O(vS vB)| = 1.
PROOF: This immediately follows from the definition of local dictatorship: if one agent
were able to enforce two different outcomes, then the other agent could not be a local
dictator. Q.E.D.
CLAIM D.2: If I∗(vS vB)= {i∗} for some i∗ ∈ I, then |O(vS vB)| ≥ 2, andO(vS vB)∩T =
∅.
PROOF: The first part of the claim follows from the fact that if O(vS vB) had just one
element, then both agents would be local dictators. The second part of the claim is a direct
implication of the first part. Q.E.D.
Claim D.2 implies that the following notations for pairs (vS vB) such that I∗(vS vB) =
{i∗} for some i∗ ∈ I are well-defined: t¯(vS vB) ≡ maxO(vS vB) ∩T and t(vS vB) ≡
minO(vS vB)∩ T .
Next, we show that the assumption that each agent has an opting out strategy implies
that only ex post individually rational outcomes can occur when agents do not choose
weakly dominated strategies.
CLAIM D.3: For any (vS vB) ∈ VS × VB, for every i ∈ {SB}, agent i with preferences vi
weakly prefers every outcome in O(vS vB) to no trade.
PROOF: The claim is straightforward for outcomes when both agents are local dicta-
tors. By Lemma 1, each agent weakly prefers at least one outcome in O(vS vB) to no
trade. By Claim D.1, if both agents are local dictators, O(vS vB) has just one element.
Hence, both agents must weakly prefer this outcome to no trade.
In the rest of the proof, we focus on the case of a unique local dictator, I(vS vB)= {i∗}.
Consider first the agent who is not the local dictator, that is, agent i = i∗. Obviously, it is
sufficient to consider only outcomes in O(vS vB) that correspond to trade at some price
t ∈ T . Consider any strategy si∗ ∈ UDi∗(vi∗) of agent i∗ that results in trade at price t
against any strategy in UDi(vi) (see Figure 1). Because i has an opting out strategy, by
Lemma 1 one of the strategies in UDi(vi) must yield at least as good an outcome as no
trade for agent i with preferences vi. This implies that trade at price t must be at least as
good as no trade for agent i with preference vi.
We are left with the task to show that, when there is a unique local dictator i∗, all out-
comes are ex post individually rational for the local dictator herself. Without loss of gen-
erality, we consider the case i∗ = S. Our proof strategy will be the following. We consider
any (vS vB) such that ex post individual rationality for the seller is violated at (vS vB). We
show that then there must be some v′S > vS and some v
′
B such that I
∗(v′S v
′
B)= {S} and ex
post individual rationality for the seller is also violated at (v′S v
′
B). This implies the claim,
because the assumption that there is any value profile at which the seller’s ex post indi-
vidual rationality were violated would imply that there would have to be a largest vS ∈ I∗S
for which individual rationality is violated for some vB, and this would be in contradiction
with the assertion that we just made.
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si∗ t t · · · t
optingout
φ
φ
···
φ
UDi∗(vi∗)
UDi(vi)
FIGURE 1.—Agent i∗ is the unique local dictator at (vS vB). In this case, trade at price t must not
be worse than no trade for agent i with value vi.
Thus, consider any (vS vB) such that I∗(vS vB) = {S} and the seller’s individual ratio-
nality is violated at (vS vB) (see Figure 2). This means that there is a strategy sS ∈UDS(vS)
for which g(sS sB) ∈ T , and g(sS sB) < vS for all sB ∈ UDB(vB). To start, note that there
must exist some v′B ∈ VB and s′B ∈ UDB(v′B) such that vS ranks g(sS s′B) above no trade.
Otherwise, for the seller with preference vS , the strategy sS would be weakly dominated
by the strategy of opting out. Since vS ranks g(sS s′B) above no trade, we have g(sS s
′
B) ∈ T
and g(sS s′B) > vS .
Our next objective is to prove the following statements about the behavior of the mech-
anism at (vS vB) and (vS v′B) (here, sB is any arbitrary strategy in UDB(vB):
(i) B is the unique local dictator at (vS v′B);
(ii) g(sS s′B) > g(sS sB);
(iii) g(sS sB) > v′B;
(iv) g(sS s′B) > v
′
B.
Proving (ii) is simple: We have g(sS sB) < vS , and, by construction, g(sS s′B) > vS .
Thus, (ii) follows. Now note that g(sS s′B) > g(sS sB) implies that v
′
B ranks g(sB s
′
B)
below g(sS sB). By Lemma 1, there must be some strategy s′′B ∈ UDB(v′B) such that
v′B ranks g(sS s
′′
B) above g(sS sB) or g(sS s
′′
B) = g(sS sB). Note that we can conclude
g(sS sB) = g(sS s′′B), and hence that (i) is true.
As an intermediate step, we show next that g(sS s′′B) = φ. If g(sS s′′B) were an element
of T , since v′B ranks g(sS s
′′
B) above g(sS sB) or g(sS s
′′
B) = g(sS sB), it would have to be
that g(sS s′′B) ≤ g(sS sB). Since vS ranks g(vS vB) below no trade, vS also ranks g(sS s′′B)
below no trade. But this contradicts the ex post individual rationality for the agent who is
not dictator, which we showed in an earlier step of this proof. We conclude: g(sS s′′B)=φ.
By construction, v′B ranks g(sS s
′′
B) above g(sS sB), hence (iii) follows from the fact that
g(sS s
′′
B) is no trade. Finally, (ii) and (iii) imply (iv).
Now note that we have obtained a pair of valuations at which the buyer is the local
dictator, and, by (iv), the buyer’s ex post individual rationality is violated. We can there-
fore repeat the argument just presented, reversing the roles of the buyer and the seller.
This yields the conclusion that there is some v′S ∈ VS , and some s′S ∈ UD(v′S) such that
g(s′S s
′
B) ∈ T and g(s′S s′B) < v′B, and:
2032 T. BÖRGERS AND J. LI
sS
sB s
′
B s
′′
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g(sS s
′
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′
B)
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′
B)
···
φ
φ
φ
···
optingout
φ
φ
···
φoptingout φ φ · · ·
g(sS sB) · · · g(sS sB)
g(s′S s
′
B) · · · g(s′S s′B)
UDS(vS)
UDS(v
′
S)
UDB(vB) UDB(v
′
B)
FIGURE 2.—The seller is the unique local dictator at (vS vB). Suppose that g(sS sB) < vS . We
then find a v′S > vS such that g(s
′
S s
′
B) < v
′
S .
(v) S is the local dictator at (v′S v
′
B);
(vi) g(s′S s
′
B) < g(sS s
′
B);
(vii) g(sS s′B) < v
′
S;
(viii) g(s′S s
′
B) < v
′
S .
The proof can now be concluded. By construction: vS < g(sS s′B). Result (vii) says:
g(sS s
′
B) < v
′
S . Hence vS < v
′
S . Moreover, (viii) shows that ex post individual rationality
for the seller is violated at (v′S v
′
B). Q.E.D.
Our next result shows that, if at some valuation profile some agent i is the unique local
dictator, this agent remains (not necessarily unique) local dictator even if we change i’s
valuation, keeping the other valuation fixed.
CLAIM D.4: Suppose I∗(vi v−i)= {i}. Then i ∈ I∗(v′i v−i) for all v′i ∈ Vi.
PROOF: Without loss of generality, we focus on the case i = S. The proof is indirect.
Let I∗(vS vB) = {S}, and suppose I∗(v′S vB) = {B} for some v′S ∈ VS . Let sS ∈ SS be the
strategy in UDS(vS) that enforces the outcome t¯(vS vB) against any strategy in UDB(vB).
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Let sB ∈ SB be the strategy in UDB(vB) that enforces the outcome t¯(v′S vB) against any
strategy in UDS(v′S).
Suppose also, first, that t¯(v′S vB) > t¯(vS vB). By Lemma D.3, vS ranks t¯(vS vB) above
no trade. Therefore, vS must also rank t¯(v′S vB) above no trade. By Lemma 1, the seller
with value vS must have a strategy in UDS(vS) that guarantees an outcome at least as good
as t¯(v′S vB) against any strategy in UDB(vB). This contradicts the definition of t¯(vS vB) as
the highest price that the seller can guarantee with a strategy in UDS(vS).
Now suppose t¯(v′S vB) < t¯(vS vB). By Lemma 1, the seller with value v
′
S must have at
least one strategy in UDS(v′S) that yields against sB an outcome at least as good as t¯(vS vB).
This contradicts that sB yields t¯(v′S vB) for all sS ∈UDS(v′S).
Finally suppose t¯(v′S vB) = t¯(vS vB). Let s′B ∈ UDB(vB) denote a strategy such that
g(sS s
′
B) = t¯(v′S vB) for all sS ∈UDS(v′S). By Claim D.2, such an s′B exists. Since the buyer
is the unique local dictator at preference profile (v′S vB), by Lemma 1, any strategy in
UDS(v
′
S) yields against s
′
B an outcome at least as good as t¯(vS vB). This outcome can-
not be trade at price t¯(vS vB), because s′B leads to an outcome other than t¯(vS vB), and
it cannot be trade at a price higher than t¯(vS vB), because we are considering the case
t¯(v′S vB) = t¯(vS vB). Therefore, any strategy in UDS(v′S) yields against s′B no trade. But
then we have concluded that the seller prefers no trade to trade at t¯(vS vB), which con-
tradicts Claim D.3, that is, the seller’s ex post individual rationality at (v′S vB). Q.E.D.
We now turn to an indirect proof of Proposition 2, that is, we postulate that a bilateral
trade mechanism is type 2 strategically simple, and then derive a contradiction. The next
four claims describe implications of the premises of the indirect proof.
CLAIM D.5: There are vS vˆS ∈ VS with vS = vˆS and vB vˆB ∈ VB with vB = vˆB such that
I∗(vS vB)= {S} I∗(vˆS vˆB)= {B}, and I∗(vS vˆB)= I∗(vˆS vB)= {SB}.
PROOF: By definition of type 2 strategic simplicity, we must have two pairs of values
in VS × VB, one at which S is the unique local dictator, and another one at which B is the
unique local dictator. By Claim D.4, these two pairs must have no component in common.
Claim D.4 also implies that if we combine the seller’s value in one pair with a buyer’s value
in the other pair, then both agents must be local dictators. Q.E.D.
For the remainder of the proof, we use the notation (vS vB) and (vˆS vˆB) to refer to the
two pairs the existence of which is asserted in Claim D.5.
CLAIM D.6: O(vS vˆB)= {φ}.
PROOF: By Claim D.1, O(vS vˆB) has only one element. Suppose O(vS vˆB) = {t} for
some t ∈ T . Using Lemma 1 for the buyer, we can infer t ≤ t(vS vB). Because at (vB vS)
the seller is the only local dictator, Claim D.2 implies that the set O(vS vB) must include
an outcome a other than t(vS vB). If this is trade at a price higher than t(vS vB), then
clearly the buyer strictly prefers t(vS vB) to a. But if a is no trade, then Claim D.3 implies
that the buyer strictly prefers t(vS vB) to a. Thus, O(vS vB) includes an outcome a that
the buyer ranks strictly below t(vS vB), and hence also strictly below t. The seller has a
strategy that locally enforces this outcome at (vS vB). By Lemma 1, this contradicts the
fact that the buyer has a strategy that enforces at (vS vˆB) the price t. Q.E.D.
CLAIM D.7: vS > vˆS and vB > vˆB.
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PROOF: The arguments are symmetric for seller and buyer. Consider the seller. Be-
cause no trade occurs at (vS vˆB), by Claim D.6, and trade at some price t is a possible
outcome at (vˆS vˆB), Lemma 1 implies that with value vS the seller must find no trade
preferable to a trade at price t. Claim D.3 says that the seller with value vˆS prefers trade
at price t to no trade. These findings together imply vS > vˆS . Q.E.D.
CLAIM D.8: O(vˆS vB)= {t∗} for some t∗ ∈ T .
PROOF: By Claim D.1, O(vˆS vB) has only one element. Suppose O(vˆS vB) = {φ}. By
Claims D.2 and D.3, trade at some price is contained inO(vS vB) that the seller with value
vS strictly prefers to no trade. When the seller has value vˆS , the seller still strictly prefers
trade at that price to no trade, because, by Claim D.7, vˆS is lower than vS . Hence we would
have a contradiction to Lemma 1 if the outcome in O(vˆS vB) were no trade. Q.E.D.
We can now complete the proof of Proposition 2. Using Lemma 1, we have t∗ =
t(vˆS vˆB). By Claim D.3, t∗ ≤ vˆB. Using Lemma 1, we also have t∗ = t¯(vS vB). But then
Lemma 1 and t∗ ≤ vˆB imply that, among the outcomes in O(vs vˆB), there must be a trade
at a price below vˆB. This contradicts Claim D.6.
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